CLOUDNATIVE SECURITYCON

NORTH AMERICA 2024

JUNE 26-27 | SEATTLE, WA #CNSCon



ULISBOA | UNIVERSIDADE DE LISBOA

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End-to-End Encryption for Container Checkpointing in Kubernetes

Radostin Stoyanov - PhD Student @ Scientific Computing Group
Adrian Reber - Senior Principal Software Engineer
Prof. Rodrigo Bruno, Prof. Wes Armour

Seattle, Washington - June 27, 2024

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Red Hat

Container Checkpointing

Understanding the use cases and mechanisms for checkpoint/restore

Container Checkpointing

Use cases:

- Fault-tolerance [1, 5]
- Fast application start-up [2, 6]
- Preemptive scheduling [5, 8]
- Load balancing (job migration) [7, 8]
- Forensic analysis [3, 4]



Core Scheduling Primitives

Failover

Suspend

Resume

Migrate

Scale up/down

Checkpoint / Restore

[1] Tanmaey Gupta, et al. *“Just-In-Time Checkpointing: Low Cost Error Recovery from Deep Learning Training Failures”* (EuroSys ‘24)
[2] Sumer Kohli, et al. *“Pronghorn: Effective Checkpoint Orchestration for Serverless Hot-Starts”* (EuroSys ‘24)
[3] Adrian Reber. *“Forensic Container Checkpointing and Analysis”* (Kubernetes Community Days Zürich 2023)
[4] Daniel Simionato, et. al. *“Digital Forensics with Container Checkpointing”* (Open Source Summit Europe 2023)
[5] Dharma Shukla, et al. *"Singularity: Planet-scale, Preemptive and Elastic Scheduling of AI Workloads”* (2022)
[6] Ritesh Naik, et al. *“Container Checkpoint/Restore at Scale for Fast Pod Startup Time”* (KubeCon EU 2021)
[7] Shubham Chaudhary, et al. *“Balancing Efficiency and Fairness in Heterogeneous GPU Clusters for Deep Learning”* (EuroSys ‘20)
[8] Victor Marmol, et al. *“Task Migration at Scale Using CRIU”* (Linux Plumbers Conference 2018)

Existing Methods for Checkpoint Encryption

Protecting sensitive data in container checkpoints

Existing Methods of Checkpoint Encryption

Local encryption



Existing Methods of Checkpoint Encryption

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

Existing Methods of Checkpoint Encryption

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

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Existing Methods of Checkpoint Encryption

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

Streaming encryption



Existing Methods of Checkpoint Encryption

Local encryption



Streaming encryption



Security Risks & Challenges

Unencrypted checkpoint data can introduce security risks

Security Risks & Challenges

- **Security Risks**
  - Access to sensitive data (session hijacking)
  - Injecting malicious code (backdoor)
  - Altering control flow of applications (privilege escalation)

- **Challenges**
  - Performance optimizations (iterative checkpointing & memory deduplication)
  - Authentication and authorization in multi-tenant clusters
  - Verifying integrity and confidentiality of checkpoint data

Iterative Checkpointing

Enabling pre-copy live migration

Iterative Checkpointing – Live Migration

Node B
Node A

Iterative Checkpointing – Live Migration



Iterative Checkpointing – Live Migration



Iterative Checkpointing – Live Migration



Iterative Checkpointing

A mechanism for providing fault-tolerance

Iterative Checkpointing – Fault Tolerance





🟦 **Computation** 🟨 **Checkpoint**

□ **Unmodified Memory** ■ **Modified Memory**

⚙ **Memory Mapping**

Iterative Checkpointing – Fault Tolerance





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```
# Clear soft-dirty bit
$ echo 4 > /proc/PID/clear_refs
```

Iterative Checkpointing – Fault Tolerance





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



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



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```

Iterative Checkpointing – Fault Tolerance

Requires multiple decryption cycles to check data availability in previous checkpoints





Memory Deduplication

Reducing the amount of checkpoint data

Memory Deduplication



Time

Iteration $_0$

🟦 Computation

🟨 Checkpoint

□ Unmodified Memory

■ Modified Memory

Memory Deduplication





🟦 **Computation** 🟨 **Checkpoint** □ **Unmodified Memory** ■ **Modified Memory**

```
/* Deallocate file space */
fallocate(KEEP_SIZE|PUNCH_HOLE)
```

Memory Deduplication





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



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



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```
/* Deallocate file space */
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```

Memory Deduplication

Requires multiple rounds of *full* encryption + decryption to modify data in previous checkpoints





Built-in Encryption

Adding support for end-to-end checkpoint encryption

Encryption Keys – Existing TLS Support

```
/etc/pki/
├── CA
│   ├── cacert.pem
│   └── cacrl.pem
└── criu
    ├── cert.pem
    └── private
        └── key.pem
```

```
[dst]$ criu page-server --tls

[src]$ criu dump --tls --page-server --address <dst>
```

https://criu.org/TLS

Radostin Stoyanov, et. al. *“Secure Image-less Container Migration”* (Linux Plumbers Conference 2019)

Checkpoint Images



Checkpoint Images



1. Protocol buffer format
2. Third-party format (raw images)
3. Memory pages

Checkpoint Images in Protobuf Format

```
syntax = "proto2";
message inventory_entry {
   required uint32 img_version = 1;
   optional bool fdinfo_per_id = 2;
   optional task_kobj_ids_entry  root_ids = 3;
   optional bool ns_per_id = 4;
   optional uint32 root_cg_set = 5;
   optional lsmtype lsmtype = 6;
   optional uint64 dump_uptime = 8;
   optional uint32 pre_dump_mode = 9;
   optional bool tcp_close = 10;
   optional uint32 network_lock_method = 11;
}
```



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

ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD

- 256-bit key
- 96-bit nonce
- 128-bit authentication tag

Checkpoint Images in Third-party Format



Checkpoint Images in Third-party Format



Encryption of Memory Pages

AES-XTS

- XOR-encrypt-XOR (XEX) tweakable block cipher with ciphertext stealing
  - Single IV per checkpoint (reduces storage overhead)
- Memory pages are accessible individually
  - Enables support for iterative checkpointing & memory deduplication
- Hardware acceleration (~7× increased performance [1])

[1] https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1244

Encryption of Memory Pages



Encryption of Memory Pages



AES-XTS

- 256-bit key + 256-bit tweak key
- 128-bit IV

Decryption of Memory Pages



Decryption of Memory Pages



End-to-End Encryption in Kubernetes

Integration with existing container runtimes

End-to-End Encryption in Kubernetes



End-to-End Encryption in Kubernetes



End-to-End Encryption in Kubernetes



End-to-End Encryption in Kubernetes



Container Checkpoint Encryption Demo

LLM Inference
(Open-WebUI + Ollama)

In-memory DB
(Redis)



Video Streaming
(Restreamer)

Performance Evaluation – Methodology

- Workloads
  - Compute-intensive – large number of CRIU images with small size (process tree)
  - Memory-intensive – small number of CRIU images with large size (memory pages)

- Alternative solutions
  - CRIU – Unencrypted checkpoint
  - CRIUsec – CRIU with built-in encryption
  - OpenSSL
  - GnuPG
  - Age

Action-script called at **post-dump** hook
(https://criu.org/Action_scripts)

Performance Evaluation – Results

Checkpoint creation time for compute-intensive workloads



Up to two orders of magnitude faster checkpoint creation

Encryption throughput for memory-intensive workloads



Up to 62% reduced encryption overhead

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Summary & Questions?

- Built-in checkpoint encryption support
- Reduced encryption overhead
- Seamless integration with Kubernetes

https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu